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Sensemaking is a 
key capability for 
military coalitions. It 
lets both individuals 
and teams make 
sense of conflicting, 
ambiguous, 
and uncertain 
information. 
Computational 
modeling provides 
one means of 
improving our 
understanding  
in this area.
the fog of war. Individuals and teams at-
tempt to develop an understanding against 
which they can make decisions and formu-
late plans for action.
At heart, sensemaking is a cognitive   
activity: it involves the processing of infor-
mation to yield an outcome that’s recogniz-
ably cognitive in nature. This doesn’t mean, 
however, that only individuals can engage 
in sensemaking. Appreciation is growing for 
the prevalence and importance of what we 
might call collective sensemaking—that is, 
the activities that groups of individuals per-
form to develop understanding at both the 
individual and collective levels.1 Work on 
collective sensemaking is the focus of an in-
creasing body of empirical and theoretical 
work in several research communities, and 
these efforts are paralleled by extensive re-
search into related notions, such as shared/
team situation awareness, shared under-
standing, and shared mental models.2
Sensemaking’s importance to contempo-
rary military organizations is reflected in 
the fact that sensemaking processes sit at the 
heart of network-centric operations (NCO). 
According to the NCO Conceptual Frame-
work (NCO-CF), for example, sensemaking 
at both the individual and collective levels 
directly affects decision synchronization, 
force agility, and mission effectiveness.3 In 
particular, sensemaking processes are an in-
tervening variable in the NCO value chain: 
they let military organizations capitalize on 
the progress made with respect to network-
ing technology and improved information-
sharing capabilities.3
Given collective sensemaking’s central 
role in coalition operations, we must develop   
a better understanding of the relationship 
between specific features of the coalition 
communication environment and aspects 
of collective sensemaking performance. At 
present, however, we have little knowledge 
of these relationships’ precise nature. One 
approach to improving our understanding is 
to develop computational models that simu-
late aspects of the sensemaking process.
Here, we present a computational model of   
collective sensemaking that we’re develop-
ing within the International Technology Al-
liance (ITA) research program. In   addition 
M
ilitary operations must often deal with incomplete, uncertain, am-
biguous, conflicting, and inaccurate information—the “fog of war” 
always confounds attempts at a complete understanding of the battlefield.   
Sensemaking is the process that military organizations undertake to deal with 
IS-28-01-Smart.indd   50 1/14/13   3:24 PMjaNuarY/fEbruarY 2013  www.computer.org/intelligent  51
to describing the model, we highlight 
some factors that might affect sense-
making performance in coalition 
contexts and describe how the model 
can represent some of them.
Coalition Environments and 
Collective Sensemaking
Military coalitions exist as complex,   
socio-technical organizations in which   
a variety of informational, cognitive, 
social, and technological factors in-
fluence collective cognitive outcomes. 
At present, our understanding of how 
these factors affect collective cognitive   
processes is limited, which makes 
testing the hypotheses and assump-
tions associated with network-centric   
warfare (or network-enabled capa-
bility) difficult. The NCO-CF, for   
example, suggests that better   
networking, interoperability, and   
information-sharing capabilities will 
likely improve collective sense-
making abilities.3 This claim certainly 
has an intuitive appeal, but greater 
levels of networking and informa-
tion sharing don’t necessarily yield 
better cognitive outcomes. In the so-
cial psychology literature, for exam-
ple, we encounter the phenomenon 
of  production blocking, or the ten-
dency for one individual’s contribu-
tions to block or inhibit contributions 
from other group members. In some 
situations, therefore, the tendency to 
share information can undermine a   
group’s collective creative poten-
tial; instead of stimulating a greater 
number and diversity of ideas, pre-
cipitant forms of information sharing 
can sometimes impede the creative 
process.
A poor understanding of how co-
alition communication environments 
can affect collective sensemaking also   
makes it hard to engineer coalition 
environments in ways that benefit 
sensemaking abilities. This doesn’t 
just apply to a military coalition’s 
technological aspects but also its so-
cial aspects. For example, military 
coalitions are composed of individu-
als from various nation states and 
military services, so they’re in a po-
sition to benefit from the diverse 
knowledge, training, and expertise 
that individuals bring to shared tasks. 
However, when it comes to collective 
cognitive processes, cognitive diver-
sity isn’t necessarily a virtue. On one 
hand, evidence suggests that cognitive 
heterogeneity is useful in mitigating 
against the cognitive biases (such as 
confirmation bias) that are sometimes 
associated with collective sensemak-
ing.4 On the other hand, a team of in-
dividuals with different background 
knowledge and beliefs can present 
challenges in terms of miscommuni-
cation due to linguistic and cultural 
differences.5 The question thus arises 
as to how we can organize collective 
sensemaking activities at the social 
level. Should we form sensemaking 
teams based on a principle of maxi-
mizing or minimizing team members’ 
cognitive diversity?
Homogeneity and diversity issues 
are also important when considering   
technology development and use 
within military coalitions. Different 
nation states or military services tend 
to adopt different approaches to rep-
resenting and storing information, 
which we often view as a barrier to in-
teroperability and collaboration. Using 
standardized representational formats 
as well as common search, retrieval, 
and storage solutions thus seems like 
an ideal way to establish cognitively 
empowering forms of collaboration 
and engagement. The downside is that 
we potentially lose any diversity in 
how information is indexed, retrieved, 
and presented. This risks exposing all 
individuals to the same information 
in the same way, which might affect a 
team’s ability to generate novel ideas 
and interpretations.
In general, efforts to press maximal 
cognitive benefit from a   coalition’s 
technological and informational   
  assets must be grounded in an under-
standing of how the coalition com-
munication environment’s various 
features affect collective cognitive 
processes. Such features can include 
trust relationships, communication 
network topologies, the timing and 
frequency of interagent communica-
tion, the extent of information shar-
ing, differential access to specific 
bodies of information, cognitive di-
versity, and the potential for miscom-
munication. Research must assess 
how these factors affect the dynam-
ics of sensemaking processes and the 
quality of sensemaking outcomes.
Constraint Satisfaction 
Model
In general, researchers have used two 
different approaches to examine col-
lective cognition. Social psycholog-
ical research tends to observe small 
groups of individuals in a particular 
task context. This approach uses real 
human subjects to test research hy-
potheses, but is often limited to small 
groups with minimally complex com-
munication structures, and it focuses 
on specific tasks that don’t necessarily 
generalize to real-world situations.
The other approach uses computer 
simulation techniques and is poten-
tially well-suited to studying collec-
tive cognitive processes in military 
coalitions: it avoids the cost (or risk) 
of running large-scale coalition-based   
experiments and lets the research com-
munity explore “what-if” scenarios   
that systematically manipulate vari-
ables that would be too impracti-
cal (or dangerous) to manipulate in   
real-world situations. Despite these   
advantages, several problems are as-
sociated with using computer simula-
tions to explore collective cognitive   
processes. One problem concerns the   
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psychological interest and 
relevance of the computa-
tional models used in the 
studies. In many cases, 
for example, the agents 
used in simulation studies 
are represented by single,   
time-variant numerical   
values, and they lack any 
kind of internal cognitive- 
processing complexity. 
Examining the effects of,   
for example, differences in  
knowledge and experience   
on sensemaking processes 
can thus be difficult.
Recent work in our laboratories   
has sought to develop a psychologi-
cally interesting computational model 
of collective sensemaking.6 The 
model adopts a network-of-networks 
approach to cognitive simulation in 
which we implement each agent as 
a constraint satisfaction network 
(CSN) and connect multiple instances 
of these networks to form an inter-
agent communication network. We 
decided to use CSNs as the basis for 
individual sensemaking abilities for 
several reasons.
First, we can usefully cast sense-
making as a type of constraint sat-
isfaction problem. In particular, we 
suggest that to make sense of infor-
mation, agents must often use back-
ground domain knowledge to form 
beliefs that are highly consistent or 
compatible. This is important be-
cause CSNs have been used to model 
psychological processes in which co-
herence and consistency issues play 
a major role. For example, one study 
used CSNs to examine cognitive dis-
sonance, in which the process of cog-
nitive change (for instance, belief 
modification) is driven by a need for 
consistency or compatibility between 
cognitive states.7
Second, CSNs let us study knowl-
edge’s role in guiding sensemaking   
performance. In particular, each node 
within the CSNs in our model corre-
sponds to a particular belief that an 
agent might hold. We refer to these 
nodes as cognitive units. They’re 
connected using either excitatory or   
inhibitory connections, and each such 
“intercognition” link is associated with 
a weighting value. The connection   
pattern between the cognitive units 
represents an agent’s background 
knowledge or experience in a partic-
ular domain. For instance, the CSN 
that Figure 1 shows has six cognitive 
units, each of which represents be-
liefs about two animal types: cats and   
birds. The cognitive units in this net-
work are connected such that they 
  reflect the natural association of par-
ticular features with particular objects.   
Thus, the “has-feathers,” “tweets,” 
and “bird” units are all connected   
with excitatory connections. This or-
ganization reflects an agent’s (admit-
tedly limited) knowledge about cat 
and bird objects. If one unit is artifi-
cially stimulated (a situation we con-
sider analogous to the presentation of 
specific kinds of evidence), then other 
units with positive connections to 
that unit will have increased activa-
tion across successive processing cy-
cles. The result is that agents settle on 
belief states that are most consistent 
with the evidence avail-
able to them, as well as 
their background knowl-
edge about the domain 
in question. If we artifi-
cially stimulate the “has-
feathers” unit, for exam-
ple, then the activity of 
the “bird” and “tweets”   
units will increase, whereas 
that of the “cat,” “has-
fur,” and “meows” units 
will decrease. This reflects 
the agent’s belief that the 
unidentified object is a 
bird, which seems a per-
fectly sensible interpretation of the 
available evidence, given the agent’s 
background knowledge.
A third reason to use CSNs centers 
on previous uses of such networks 
to explore the dynamics of collec-
tive sensemaking. In particular, Ed-
win Hutchins has used CSNs to ex-
amine the psychological phenomenon 
of confirmation bias8—that is, peo-
ple’s tendency to ignore or discount 
evidence that contradicts some ini-
tial interpretation of a situation. Us-
ing CSNs, Hutchins demonstrated 
that the timing of interagent com-
munication significantly influences 
the dynamics of collective sensemak-
ing. In particular, if individual agents 
communicated with each other from 
a simulation’s outset, then extreme 
confirmation bias arose. This oc-
curred because each agent, influenced 
by information from other agents in 
the social network, was under pres-
sure to discover a shared interpreta-
tion of the input data. In other words, 
the community strove to find a set 
of activation patterns that best sat-
isfied the internal constraints that 
 interagent  communication  had estab-
lished. The result was that agents of-
ten failed to give due weight to the 
evidence from external input data; 
more often than not, the community 
Has-fur Has-feathers
Meows Tweets
Bird Cat
Figure 1. Example constraint satisfaction network (CSN) 
representing beliefs about two kinds of objects: cats and birds. 
Solid lines symbolize excitatory connections between the units, 
whereas broken lines symbolize inhibitory links. Circles represent 
cognitive units. Shaded circles represent beliefs about the 
objects’ features (feature beliefs), whereas plain circles represent 
beliefs about object type (object beliefs).
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exhibited more extreme confirmation 
bias than did isolated individuals.
Communication Network 
Structure and Sensemaking 
Performance
Although CSNs have a long history 
of use within the computer and psy-
chological sciences, their specific ap-
plication to collective sensemaking   
processes has been somewhat limited. 
In addition, we don’t always know 
how to accommodate the range of 
psycho-social and technological   
factors potentially affecting sense-
making performance in conventional 
CSN-based simulations. The model 
of collective sensemaking that we’ve 
developed relies on a particular form 
of CSN that’s used to study cogni-
tive dissonance.7 By relying on a 
CSN that was originally developed 
to model psychological phenomena 
(and validated against psychologi-
cal data), we aim to deliver a simu-
lation capability that yields a range 
of psychologically interesting and 
relevant results. Furthermore, by in-
corporating a range of configuration 
parameters, we hope to represent a 
subset of the features that we’d typi-
cally find in coalition communication   
environments—for example, variable 
levels of interagent trust, differential 
access to specific bodies of situation- 
relevant information, and inter-
individual differences in background 
knowledge and experience.
To exemplify our model’s applica-
tion and use, we recently used it to 
examine the role different commu-
nication network structures played 
in mediating minority influence un-
der various informational conditions. 
In one such condition, a minority of 
agents received strong evidence in fa-
vor of one interpretation, whereas a 
majority received weak evidence in 
favor of a conflicting interpretation.6 
We configured the CSNs (each rep-
resenting an individual sensemaking 
agent) as indicated in Figure 1, with 
six cognitive units representing be-
liefs about cats and birds (note that 
this configuration represents just one 
particular instantiation of the model; 
alternative configurations could have 
more cognitive units with more com-
plex patterns of intercognitive unit 
connectivity).
For each simulation, we created   
20 agents and connected them to 
form one of four communication net-
work structure types (see Figure 2a). 
At the beginning of each simulation, 
we randomly selected five agents for 
assignment to the minority group, 
while assigning the remaining 15 
agents to the majority group. We then 
initialized the agents in each group 
with activation vectors that estab-
lished the initial activation levels of 
cognitive units within the agent. For 
minority group members, we set the 
activation of the “has-fur” unit at 0.5 
and the activation of all other units at 
0.0. For the majority group members, 
we set the activation of the “has-
feathers” unit at 0.1 and all other 
units at 0.0.
Because the initial activation of 
cognitive units represents an agent’s 
beliefs at the simulation’s outset (re-
flecting, perhaps, exposure to differ-
ent evidence), we can see that agents 
in the two groups had different be-
liefs about the object’s features they 
were presented with. Over the course 
of successive processing cycles, we 
would expect these two initial belief 
Figure 2. Experimental results. We studied how (a) the communication network structure affected collective sensemaking. 
Nodes represent agents, and lines indicate communication channels. We also determined (b) the mean activation levels of the 
“cat” and “bird” cognitive units in each network structure condition. Standard error of the mean (SEM) isn’t shown, but in all 
cases it was less than 0.03.
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states to generate different interpre-
tations about the object type. Agents 
in the two groups also differed with 
respect to the activation levels asso-
ciated with cognitive units. In terms 
of the activation levels’ psychological 
significance, greater activation levels 
reflect an agent’s confidence or cer-
tainty in a particular belief. Thus, in 
our simulations, agents in the minor-
ity group had greater certainty that a 
particular feature was present com-
pared to agents in the majority group.
We studied how these initial infor-
mational conditions affected the   
emergence of belief states using   
four network structure conditions   
(see Figure 2a). Our study addressed 
the question of how the different net-
work structures would affect agents’ 
tendencies to settle on different in-
terpretations of the available evi-
dence. Would agents come to adopt 
the minority view that a cat object 
was present, or would they adopt the 
competing interpretation that a bird 
was present? At the individual level, 
each agent attempted to reconcile the 
information it received from other 
agents and the environment with its 
own background knowledge of the 
domain. Agents arrived at a particular 
interpretation of the information that 
manifested itself in the activation pat-
tern across their cognitive units. The 
communication links thus changed 
how agents responded to environ-
mental information: agents adjusted 
their interpretations in ways that con-
sidered the information their network 
neighbors provided.
Figure 2b shows our experimen-
tal results, which we obtained by re-
cording the “cat” and “bird” units’ 
activation levels after 20 processing 
  cycles, and by running 50 simulations 
in each of the four network struc-
ture conditions. As the figure sug-
gests, with the “cat” cognitive unit, 
activation was greatest in the fully 
connected network and lowest in the   
disconnected network; activation in   
the random and small-world net-
works was at an intermediate level. 
With the “bird” cognitive unit, we 
obtained the reverse pattern: activa-
tion was lowest in the fully connected 
network, highest in the disconnected 
network, and at intermediate levels 
in the random and small-world net-
works. This pattern suggests that   
communication networks with   
different structural topologies dif-
ferentially affect sensemaking per-
formance. In situations in which a 
minority of agents receives strong 
evidence in favor of one interpreta-
tion and a majority receives evidence 
in favor of an alternative, compet-
ing interpretation, the communica-
tion network structure mediated the 
effect of the minority’s influence on 
collective interpretative outcomes. In 
particular, fully connected networks 
enable strong but uncommon evi-
dence to quickly influence all agents’ 
beliefs before weaker, contradictory 
evidence has had time to contribute 
to opposing beliefs. With small-world 
and random networks, weaker evi-
dence has more time to contribute to 
beliefs that are progressively more re-
sistant to change across successive 
processing cycles.
Model Parameters and 
Coalition Environment 
Features
The aforementioned study focuses on 
one aspect of military coalition envi-
ronments: the potential for communi-
cation to be influenced by a range of 
communication networks that differ 
in their topological structure. Several 
other factors could affect sensemak-
ing processes in coalition settings, 
however, including the level of trust 
between agents, the extent of infor-
mation sharing, and the potential for 
miscommunication based on cultural 
or linguistic differences. Our model 
can support simulations that repre-
sent at least some of these factors. It 
can represent trust, for example, via 
the weighting associated with specific 
interagent connections, and we can 
specify different values for the links 
between the cognitive units located 
in each connected agent. This reflects 
the fact that agents might have differ-
ent trust levels regarding particular 
beliefs.
Another factor the model can rep-
resent concerns individual differences 
in knowledge and experience. Each 
link between cognitive units within 
a single agent represents a psycho-
logical implication or association be-
tween belief states, with the link’s 
weight reflecting this implication’s or 
association’s strength. The set of in-
tercognition links for each agent thus 
represents the background knowl-
edge (including assumptions, stereo-
types, and prejudices) that the agent 
brings to bear in making sense of 
the information presented. It follows 
that individual variability in the CSN 
structure (in terms of the weights as-
sociated with intercognition links) 
will reflect differences in background 
knowledge. This gives us a way to in-
vestigate the relative benefits of cog-
nitive homogeneity/heterogeneity in 
sensemaking teams under different 
informational conditions. It has been 
suggested that cultural differences 
within coalitions reflect statistically 
significant differences in the cognitive 
structures associated with the mem-
bers of different cultural groups.9 
Thus, varying intercognition links 
according to group membership cri-
teria could let us adapt our model to 
explore cultural diversity’s effect on 
sensemaking performance.
Other factors our model can rep-
resent include the frequency of inter-
agent communication, resistance to 
social influence, and access to specific 
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bodies of information (for example, 
where different agents are exposed 
to different subsets of information). 
Obviously, these factors will inter-
act with each other in complex ways 
during a simulation; thus, the results 
obtained with one particular config-
uration (such as the experiment ex-
ploring the communication network 
structure) aren’t invariant across sim-
ulations in which another model pa-
rameter (for example, resistance to 
social influence) is systematically ma-
nipulated. We can’t use the experi-
mental results described in relation to 
one particular study to predict model 
behavior in a different experimental 
context.
Model Limitations
Although our model can accommo-
date some features of collective sen-
semaking in coalition environments, 
it doesn’t capture all the richness 
and complexity of the sensemaking 
process as seen in real-world situa-
tions. Perhaps one of its most impor-
tant shortcomings is that it doesn’t 
consider the role knowledge-guided   
interactions with the real world play 
in letting agents make sense of con-
flicting, uncertain, or ambiguous   
information. Thus, in most cases 
of  real-world sensemaking, human 
agents are likely to actively engage 
with the external environment to sup-
port their ongoing attempts at pat-
tern completion and recognition. Hu-
man agents engaged in sensemaking 
don’t just react passively to the infor-
mation they receive; they also seek 
to manipulate their information en-
vironments to meliorate their access 
to hidden patterns, relationships, and 
contingencies. This emphasis on real-
world interaction is evident in many 
discussions of human sensemaking. 
David Kirsh, for example, argues that 
manipulating external representa-
tions can transform the cost structure 
associated with the inference land-
scape,10 improving our access to hid-
den or implicit information. Clearly, 
agents in the model presented here 
don’t actively explore or manipu-
late their information environments, 
which highlights one focus area for 
future modeling work.
Our model’s shortcomings in this 
respect obviously limit the range of 
application contexts in which it can be 
administered or used. In particular, the   
model isn’t intended to replace real-
world empirical investigations involv-
ing human agents. Rather, its best use 
is to guide decisions about what kind 
of real-world studies with human 
subjects should be undertaken. Com-
putational models let us run a large 
number of experiments exploring dif-
ferent combinations of variables— 
which is difficult or impossible to 
perform in real-world coalition envi-
ronments. The results from computer 
simulation experiments can help gen-
erate specific hypotheses concerning 
collective cognitive performance, and 
researchers can subsequently evalu-
ate these hypotheses using real-world 
empirical analyses.
S
ensemaking has been described 
as a macrocognitive function 
that lets individuals and groups make 
sense of information and develop the 
understanding required for effec-
tive decision making.11 It’s a particu-
larly important topic for research in 
military coalition contexts because it 
constitutes a central part of the value 
chain that leads from higher-quality 
networking technologies to greater 
levels of command agility and mis-
sion effectiveness.3
The computational model we pres-
ent aims to improve our understand-
ing of how specific features of the co-
alition communication environment 
might affect collective sensemaking 
processes. By combining the results 
from both real-world experiments 
and computer simulation studies, we 
hope to derive some insight into how 
collective cognition is affected by 
these features. This, in turn, will help 
guide scientific research and tech-
nological development in ways that 
enable military coalitions to press 
maximal cognitive benefit from the 
informational, technological, and 
human resources they have at their 
disposal.
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